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ABSTRACT
TOWARDS AN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE FRAMEWORK OF SECURE CLOUD COMPUTING
By Yulong Zhang, M.S.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at
Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012.
Major Director: Meng Yu, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Virginia Commonwealth University
Cloud computing has changed how services are provided and supported through the computing infrastructure. It has the advantages such as flexibility , scalability , compatibility and availability . However,
the current architecture design also brings in some troublesome problems, like the balance of cooperation benefits and privacy concerns between the cloud provider and the cloud users, and the balance
of cooperation benefits and free-rider concerns between different cloud users. Theses two problems
together form the incentive problem in cloud environment.
The first conflict lies between the reliance of services and the concerns of secrets of cloud users. To
solve it, we proposes a novel architecture, NeuCloud, to enable partially, trusted, transparently, accountably privacy manipulation and revelation. With the help of this architecture, the privacy-sensitive
users can be more confident to move to public clouds. A trusted computing base is not enough, in order
to stimulate incentive-compatible privacy trading, we present a theoretical framework and provide the
guidelines for cloud provider to compensate the cloud user’s privacy-risk-aversion. We implement the
NeuCloud and evaluate it. Moreover, a improved model of NeuCloud is discussed.
The second part of this thesis strives to solve the free-rider problem in cloud environment. For example,
the VM-colocation attacks have become serious threats to cloud environment. We propose to construct

an incentive-compatible moving-target-defense by periodically migrating VMs, making it much harder
for adversaries to locate the target VMs. We developed theories about whether the migration of VMs
is worthy and how the optimal migration interval can be determined. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first effort to develop a formal and quantified model to guide the migration strategy
of clouds to improve security. Our analysis shows that our placement based defense can significantly
improve the security level of the cloud with acceptable costs.
In summary, the main objective of this study is to provide an incentive-compatible to eliminate the
cloud user’s privacy or cooperative concerns. The proposed methodology can directly be applied in
commercial cloud and help this new computing fashion go further in the history. The theoretical part
of this work can be extended to other fields where privacy and free-rider concerns exist.

ix

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Cloud Computing

Cloud computing [7] is becoming a major trend in computing services with its inspiring features of elastic “data anywhere” and “computing anywhere”. Generally, there are three types of cloud computing
services: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS). Among them the IaaS is the most fundamental one, where a cloud user owns a virtual machine
(VM) and purchases virtual power to execute as needed, just like running a virtual server. A typical
example of public IaaS is the Amazon Elastic Computing (EC2) Services [2], of which the abstraction
of architecture is shown in Figrue 1.1.
The architecture shown in Figure 1.1 is also used by Eucalyptus [3], OpenNebular [5], and many
other open-source cloud products [12]. In the architecture, a Cloud Controller (CLC) provides cloud
interfaces to clients. The Cluster Controller (CC) manages the intranet and schedules Virtual Machines
(VMs) execution on nodes belonging to it, and each Node Controller (NC) directly controls VMs
instances that it hosts. On a node with Type-I virtualization, a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), such

1

Figure 1.1: A general cloud computing architecture.
as Xen [10], abstracts the hardware resources and replace all the direct communications between VMs
and hardware to hypercalls, endowing management authority to a special control VM, e.g., Dom 0. On
a node with Type-II virtualization, a host operating system adds a module functioning as VMM, such as
KVM [20], to manage guest VMs. In the current architecture, there is no separation of privilege design
to deprive unnecessary privileges from the service provider. The service provider owns the hardware,
hypervisor, and control VM, becoming the Dictator of the cloud.

1.2

Incentive Compatible Problems

This IaaS architecture has its advantages such as flexibility (VMs can be easily migrated to every
corner of the cloud, without shutting down the service), scalability (a huge population of VMs can
be integrated into the cloud and some of them can group into clusters), compatibility (VMs can be
2

VM1

VM3

VM2

VM4

VMM
Figure 1.2: The mutual relationships in a typical public cloud.
launched in the virtualization environment regardless of the beneath hardware and the instruction set
as long as their Operating Systems are supported by the VMM) and usability (many services can be
outsourced to VMM, e.g. Intrusion Detection Service (IDS) [35], to minimize cost and management
efforts). However, this architecture design also brings in some troublesome problems, like the balance
of cooperation benefits and privacy concerns between the cloud provider and the cloud users, and the
balance of cooperation benefits and free-rider concerns between different cloud users. Theses two
problems together form the incentive problem in cloud environment.

The Balance of Services and Secrets

As illustrated in Figure 1.2, from a cloud user’s view, typically there are three roles inside the IaaS public cloud: the cloud user himself/herself, the other cloud neighbour VMs owned by unknown parties,
and the cloud provider.
Taking the advantages of cloud computing, the cloud user can outsource part of his/her computation or
data to the cloud provider. Unavoidably, the secrets inside the user’s data might be seen by the cloud
provider. We admit that those commercial cloud providers would sign a service contract with cloud
users, which clearly indicates the responsibility and liability of cloud provider regarding to the privacy
protection. However, the policies written on paper cannot make the users more confident: with cloud
provider alone as the “dictator” in the cloud environment, who can supervise the operation of the cloud
3

provider? How to trace the manipulation of their privacy given that cloud users have no control at all
towards their data in cloud? Even if the cloud provider is well-meant, how to prevent its employee to
launch insider-attacks? Up to now these answers still remain agnostic to commercial cloud services.
Then, someone might ask, what if the cloud user chooses not to share any secrets with the cloud
provider and restricts his/her computation/data in an isolated or encrypted domain? This suggestion
seems promising at first glance. However, why do the cloud users bother to use cloud if they don’t
make use of it? They can instead use the local resources to achieve the same goal, which saves the
communication cost and the isolation/encryption cost. As a matter of fact, following this philosophy,
some bank and government organizations turn to the private cloud solutions instead of the above public
IaaS approach. Nevertheless, for small users, whose purpose is to outsource daily computing, public
cloud is still the most economical alternative and thus the service-privacy conflict still remains a serious
task as well as challenge for researchers.

The Balance of Contribution and Gain In Cooperation

Except the service-privacy trade-off between cloud users and cloud provider, another issue shown in
Figrue 1.2 is the cooperation game between cloud users themselves. On one hand, Each cloud user has
no clue about his/her neighbours; they might be benign but they might be malicious either. In order to
defend such kind of internal attacks, the cooperation of different cloud users becomes necessary (we
will discuss about a certain example in Chapter 3). At the same time, there are enormous number of
attacks launched outside the cloud, it must be more effective if all the cloud users can unite with each
other to defend those attacks. As a whole, the cooperation of cloud users should improve the overall
utility. However, on the other hand, none of the rational individuals would prefer to contribute; cloud
users expect the benefit of cooperation but none of them would like to pay for the public utility shared
by the overall community. In the traditional cloud computing envrionment, everyone has the incentive
to be the free-rider. Thus it becomes the second serious challenge.
4

The above two problems are tightly connected with each other. The conflict between outsourcing service and the concerns of privacy disclosure reflects the subtle one-to-one relationship between the cloud
provider and each cloud user, which is the root incentive-compatible problem in cloud environment.
Only if the root trust problem is solved, will the cloud provider be able to act like the arbiter to further
mitigate the conflict between cloud users. So on one hand, the two problems describes two parallel conflicting relationships; on the other hand, the solution of the latter relies on the settlement of the former.
The goal of this thesis is to address the above two challenges one by one. The service-privacy conflict
is analysed in Chapter 2, where a novel cloud computing architecture and a theoretic framework are
proposed to provide trusted and transparent privacy exchange. With the trusted cloud provider given
in Chapter 2 as the arbiter, a game theory based solution of the free-rider problem is discussed later
in Chapter 3. As a specific case, the VM moving-target defence is analysed and incentive-compatible
cooperative defence framework is developed for it.
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Chapter 2
NeuCloud: The Trusted Computing Base for
Incentive-compatible Privacy Trading
Cloud computing [7] is becoming a major trend in computing services with its inspiring features of
elastic “data anywhere” and “computing anywhere”. Meanwhile, because services are carried out in
a form where customers do not directly manage their private data, cloud computing has also been the
subject of much public scrutiny concerning issues of privacy protection. According to a survey result,
concern about the possibility of privacy leakage has become the most critical reason that hinders a
broad adoption of Cloud Computing [4]. Additionally, even if the clients themselves can trust the cloud
provider, some privacy related laws restrict a business’ freedom to outsource their sensitive computing
to cloud providers [18]. Therefore, many new security mechanisms have been developed to protect
users’ privacy. Many techniques have been proposed to protect data privacy through cryptography or
system-level modifications [13, 23, 46, 39, 44, 17, 28, 34]. The unified goal of the above approaches is
shown in the left part in Figure 2.1, which aims to hide 100% of users’ content from the cloud provider.
To name a few, some methods strive to thoroughly eliminate Hypervisors and rely on the tamperresistant processor to provide virtualization, as introduced by “NoHype” [25]. This kind of approach
6

is probably the ultimate scheme to defend malicious or compromised service provider. Apart from
the architectural improvement attempts, , encrypting the data stored on the cloud computing platform
is also promising [13, 23, 45, 29, 31]. All of these solutions hide a client’s private data from the
service provider while the client is retrieving data. An improved approach is the fully homomorphic
encryption [19], which allows computation on encrypted data. Following the steps, Microsoft has
proposed a practical and efficient scheme to perform homomorphic encryption [27].
However, a full encrypted or isolated view from the cloud provider is unacceptable; many cloud services should be carried out with the sacrifice of privacy, due to the following compelling reasons:

Cloud Security Considerations

The cloud monitoring is necessary to protect the cloud environment from the VM-to-host attacks and
the cross-VM attacks. An example of the former one is the “Xen 0wning Trilogy” [1]; and an illustration of the latter one is to make use of Amazon EC2 instances to attack other VMs on the same
physical node via the cache side channel [42]. Currently cloud providers has to utilize more and more
comprehensive approaches to monitor the platform. For example, with the help of Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) [33, 35, 38] a cloud provider can look into a virtual machine (VM) and enforce
security policies. Sometimes the monitoring method even bridges the semantic gap and reveals more
details to cloud provider [15]. Allowing the service provider to look into the memory space of the
guest operating systems, and to inspect the processes of the client, obviously may lead to disclosure of
the client’s private data, especially when users are not aware of where their data are hosted and how
they are executed.
Consequently, the mutual distrust between the service provider and client leads to the unavoidable
conflict of interest [40]. Service providers have to see the internal world of a client’s virtual machine to
secure the computing environment to ensure the security of the whole cloud, but this definitely violates

7

Privacy
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Figure 2.1: The philosophy of NeuCloud: partially and transparently disclosure of privacy.
the privacy requirement of a client. But when we reconsider about the problem, we may ask: Does
the cloud provider really need to directly monitor and manage the VMs? We argue that in most

situations, the cloud management works are actually conducted on higher layers instead of directly
on the physical nodes. As long as the high-level security policies are enforced, it is unnecessary for
cloud provider to directly tap into the content of VMs. It is true that under some other circumstances,
certain domain knowledge is required so that cloud provider has to directly scan users’ sensitive data .
However, we may ask another question: Is it necessary to monitor all the data and processes of the
VMs? Not all of cloud users’ data and programs are privileged enough to arouse serious attacks. Since

he full-monitoring scheme has dispelled so many privacy-concerning users, cloud provider should reconsider the trade-off of doing so. From this perspective, cloud provider may balance the degree of
monitoring to attract more users.

Performance and Economics Considerations

Some system-level approaches, like the “NoHype” [25], requires hardware modifications and that each
VM should occupy a unique core, of which the cost is still unacceptable to most service providers
nowadays running on common commercial CPUs. The encryption based protection may be relatively
cheap, but it either restricts the computing functions (normal encryption methods are not eligible for
arbitrary computing) or the performance (in the case of the homogeneous encryption methods). Thus
a 100% protection of private information is somehow impractical.
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As a whole, either the totally public scheme or the totally private scheme is acceptable. We need a
hybrid solution as shown in Figure 2.1. The philosophy is not only about “half public and half private”
but also about “trading privacy” at any rate, so that the user can selectively and confidently exchange
their privacy with the cloud provider. All the requirements of this philosophy will be described in
Section 2.1.

2.1

Design Goals

The NeuCloud design should satisfy the following goals:

1. Being able to protect users’ privacy from the cloud provider. This is the most significant
requirement. Only if secrets can be effectively hidden from the view of the privileged “dictator”,
should the privacy-sensitive users turn back to the public cloud. Nevertheless, this is also the
most challenging target. It can never be easy to hide secrets from a dictator right in his/her
kingdom.
2. With the ability to isolate VMs. Protecting privacy from the cloud provider is not the only
assurance to be achieved. NeuCloud should also be able to isolate information from different
VMs, unless they explicitly want to share it with each other.
3. Without losing common functions, including security monitoring. It is good to have a full
protection upon privacy. But as we have discussed above, a hybrid scheme should be provided
so that only the crucial secrets are protected and the other functional and security-related entities
should be able to be exposed.
4. Enabling transparent and accountable operation on privacy. Protection is not enough; we
should convince the users how well they are protected and who should be blamed if disclosure
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happens. NeuCloud should be able to transparently and fairly reveal such information and log
all the operations upon secrets.
5. Making maximum use of legacy platforms. Many talent ideas have been proposed by the
academics by never been applied ever since. The reason is that they are too expensive for the
industry. NeuCloud should take advantages from legacy platforms as much as possible.
6. Secure enough to be the TCB. The last but not the least, as a Trusted Computing Base (TCB),
NeuCloud must be secure enough. That is to say, it has to protect itself from being compromised.

2.2 Background
2.2.1

Root of Trust Measurement

In order to protect the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) from being compromised, the Root of Trust
Measurement (RTM) mechanism is used (Figure 2.2), which mainly relied on the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) chip. Specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), the TPM chip can be used
to authenticate hardware devices [32]. It can be commonly found on almost all the motherboards of
servers and high-end PCs. A unique and secret RSA Endorsement Key (EK) is generated for each
TPM at the time of manufacture and will be permanently sealed inside the chip, and other sensitive
data will be stored into shielded memory. The Privacy CA (Certificate Agency) can authenticate a
TPM according to its public Endorsement Key. The main role of TPM chips in trusted computing is
to act as the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM), which measures the integrity metrics of
modules, holds them in Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) and reports them in an authenticated
way in remote attestation. For privacy concerns, EK is not allowed to be used as platform identity
directly. Instead, Application Identity Keys (AIKs) are created to sign these PCR values. A detailed
example to establish TCB with TPM can be found in Terra model [17].
10
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TPM Init

CRTM

BIOS
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8

Measurement
Passing control
Extending PCR
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Figure 2.2: The schematic view of RTM boot process.
PE=1
PE=0
Real-Address Mode

Protected Mode

SMI#
RSM#

SMI#
RSM#

System Management Mode

Figure 2.3: The system mode transition graph (using Intel as an example)
Figure 2.2 shows the boot sequence based on RTM: after system boot or reset, the TPM chip gets
initialized. It measures the CRTM block in BIOS and extends the TPM PCR; after that the CRTM
code is executed and then the BIOS, the MBR, and finally the OS (VMM for cloud platform). During
each transition, the measurement value of the next step is always extended into PCR by the following
operation:

PCR := SHA − 1(PCR + measurement)

A new measurement value is concatenated with the current PCR value and then hashed by SHA-1. The
result will be stored as a new value of the PCR.
For normal platforms, user can access TPM chip via common driver interfaces. However, in the virtualization environment, user cannot directly talk to TPM chip from a VM. Under such circumstance,
vTPM [11] is carried out to realize RTM support.
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Memory Space

SMBASE + FFFFh
SMM State-Save Area
SMBASE + FE00h
SMRAM

SMM Handler
SMBASE + 8000h

SMBASE

Figure 2.4: Default SMRAM Memory Map

2.2.2 System Management Mode
Both Intel and AMD CPUs support the (System Management Mode)SMM as one of its operating
modes. The processor enters the SMM when receiving an SMI, as shown in Figure 2.3. Upon an SMI,
the processor saves its state to a dedicated state save map and switches to the SMM. To return from the
SMM, the special instruction RSM restores the saved processor state and resumes normal execution.
SMM code is stored in a designated memory called SMRAM 2.4. To provide protection of the SMM
code and data, both AMD and Intel provide the capability of locking the SMRAM. When the SMRAM
is locked, all accesses to it, except from within the SMM, are prevented. All interrupts, including nonmaskable ones, are disabled upon entering the SMM. Thus, no other code running on the system can
interfere with the SMI handler. Current hardware can support up to 4 GB of SMRAM. The application
of SMM in cloud security has gradually become popular, and it is well accepted by the academia that
SMM is an excellent stealthy secure environment [22, 8, 9].
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VM0
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Figure 2.5: The basic architecture of NeuCloud.

2.3

NeuCloud Overview: An In-memory Private Space For Transparent Privacy Trading

Figure 2.5 provides an overview of the NeuCloud architecture. We use the “Type-I” virtualization
architecture as an example, and the other type of virtualization platforms can be modified in the similar
fashion. The SMRAM is protected from the view of either the cloud provider or the cloud users, and is
only visible to the special SMM handlers, which will be introduced later in this section. The rest of the
memory space, denoted as “normal RAM” here, is managed by a legacy VMM with NeuCloud driver
installed. The NeuCloud driver is unnecessary to be included into TCB as regards privacy protection,
but is required to get full NeuCloud support. The privileged “VM0” (“Domain0” in Xen architecture)
is kept unmodified, so are the unprivileged cloud users’ VMs, except that a NeuCloud client should be
installed in the users’ VMs if they need NeuCloud functions.
The “VM1” in Figure 2.5 represents one of the cloud users’ VMs. Since the VM’s memory space is
virtualized via the shadow paging mechanism [21], theoretically the private information inside “VM1”
is not a secret to VMM at all. This is the exact root cause keeping those privacy-sensitive users away
from the public clouds, where their secrets are transparent to many potential adversaries, including the
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Figure 2.6: The functional modules of NeuCloud.
cloud provider, the attackers being able to compromise the VMM, and the neighbour VMs who can
eavesdrop on them [42]. To get avoid of this problem, a logical “private cloud” is inserted beneath
the public cloud: the NeuCloud. By “private cloud”, we don’t mean the NeuCloud layer privately
belongs to some parties; it is a neutral domain impartially and transparently managing the privacy and
the corresponding polices.
To realize NeuCloud, we program the BIOS and add some special SMM handlers, including the frontend modules and the back-end modules, as shown in Figure 2.6. As we mentioned, the absence of
NeuCloud client (in users’ VMs) and the NeuCloud driver (in VMM) will not influence the public cloud
functions; but in order to enjoy the private cloud services, they are required. The NeuCloud driver adds
a new service daemon into the VMM, which is a new hypercall for Xen in particular. Users can call the
service daemon via the NeuCloud client, and the NeuCloud driver will continue to deliver the data and
corresponding operations to the NeuCloud layer. Only a fixed set of operations are accepted to avoid
unknown malicious exploitations. Since the NeuCloud manager will further parse and authenticate the
requested operations, the compromise of the NeuCloud driver will not lead to privacy leakage or data
damage. All the delivered data is encrypted from the cloud provider’s view, which will be discussed
later in this section. Upon receiving the service requests, the service daemon will update the current
task pool. For simplicity, we design a ring structure to fairly schedule the tasks based on the round-
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robin algorithm. Each VM owns a one-operation slice in the ring, and new operations requested by a
VM will be inserted into the task FIFO queue corresponding to its unique time slice 1 ; 3) when the task
pointer active one task, if the operation doesn’t carry any new data, the NeuCloud driver will invoke
SMI entering into SMM and perform the operation (copy, delete, encrypt, decrypt, add-policy, deletepolicy, etc.); 4) if the operation does carry new data (not existing inside SMRAM), data should be first
of all prepared as encrypted blocks and the operation parameters should contain the block size. This
will divide an operation into several tasks, and for each task the NeuCloud manager only takes data
with sizes under a predefined maximum value. The reason of processing limited size of data each time
is that SMM diables timer interrupt so that timing is impossible; for the same reason the pre-emption
from SMM is also impossible. We use the limited-time-processing trick to circumvent this drawback
of SMM, and it won’t bring in any influence to cloud users since most of the popular cryptography
methods are based on block encryption/decryption.
Once received the tasks, the NeuCloud manager will parse and authenticate them. Two categories of
tasks are allowed: mutual authentication, which includes task originator and finisher authentication,
and new users’ key exchange for future task authentications; data and policies manipulation, which
includes encryption/decryption, data and policies modification, policies based privacy sharing, etc. All
the operations will be logged and written into corresponding journals, thus accountability is guaranteed.
The overall NeuCloud design is a complex and challenging.In the following discussions we will describe the internal mechanisms in detail. The notation used in this section is as follows:

1. message: Any objects that needs to be encrypted;
2. {message1 , message2 }: Concatenation of messages;
3. (message)SKowner : Encryption with owner’s symmetric/session key;
1

An operation is the basic execution unit for cloud users. The NeuCloud daemon will further divide an operation into
several tasks depending on the data size.
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4. (message)KPub
: Encryption with owner’s public key;
owner
5. [message]KPri
: Signing with owner’s private key;
owner
6. Cert(KPub
owner ): The certificate of owner’s public key.

2.3.1 Trusted Boot Procedure
The first challenge is how to boot the NeuCloud along with the legacy virtualization system. As shown
in Figure 2.7, upon system boot or reset, the TPM chip is initialized. It then measures the Core Root of
Trust for Measurement (CRTM) in BIOS boot block, which will further measures the SMM handlers
that will be written into SMRAM. Note that all the measurement results will be extended into the Platform Configuration Register (PCR). Except the common boot operations, the BIOS boot block needs
to setup the SMRAM region and copy SMM handlers (front-end modules and back-end modules)into
the SMRAM. After that the BIOS hands over the platform control to the boot code in SMM by calling
Pri
SMI. The SMM boot code will then generate a fresh asymmetric key-pair (KPub
SMM , KSMM ), and extend

the public key information into the PCR. Later all the cloud users can easily obtain this public key from
TPM. Finishing the initialization of SMM handlers, NeuCloud will pass the control back to BIOS and
continue the normal boot procedure through the Master Boot Record (MBR), loading the VMM and
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other legacy components. Afterwards, all the users on the platform are able to request for attestation
at any time. Cloud provider (“VM0” and VMM) can simply interact with the TPM chip, while cloud
users have to go through the vTPM [11] channels. The attestation procedure is:

1. On receipt of a request for attestation challenge, the TPM chp will respond with the public Attestation Identity Key (AIKPub ) and the certified public Endorsement Key (EKPub ). The challengers
can further validate the certification of the EKPub by forwarding the keys to the Privacy CA [32].

NeuCloud → Challenger → PrivacyCA : {AIKPub , EKPub }
2. If the certification of the EKPub is valid, the Privacy CA signs a certificate for AIKPub , and encrypts the certificate with a newly created session key SKPCA . Along with them, SKPCA and

AIKPub , encrypted by EKPub , are altogether sent back to the challenger. The challenger then
deliver the second blob to the TPM chip.

PrivacyCA → Challenger : {([Cert(AIKPub )]KPri
)SKPCA , ({SKPCA , AIKPub })EKPub }
PCA
Challenger → NeuCloud : ({SKPCA , AIKPub })EKPub
3. Once received them, the NeuCloud TPM decrypts the SKPCA and AIKPub using its EK( Pri), and
checks if the AIKPub matches with the one it owns. If everything goes well, the NeuCloud releases
the session key SKPCA .

NeuCloud → Challenger : SKPCA
4. With the session key, the challenger can obtain the signed certificate of AIKPub . Now that AIKPub
is authenticated, the user can generate a random number n to perform the real-time platform
attestation by asking for the signed PCR value along with this one-time random number.

Challenger → NeuCloud : (n)EKPub
5. The TPM chip should reply with the Stored Measurement Log (SML, containing the BIOS, MBR
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and VMM measurement fingerprints as well as the public key of NeuCloud SMM handlers,
Pub
KPub
.
SMM ), along with the PCR value and the random number signed by AIK

NeuCloud → Challenger : {[{PCR, n}]AIKPub , SML}
6. Upon receiving them, the challenger first of all check if n is correct, and then applying the PCR’s
extend operation on SML (to see if it is the same with the received PCR value). If everything
matches, and the platform measurement fingerprints in SML satisfying the challenger’s requirement, the attestation is finished with success and the KPub
SMM can be confidently used in the later
authentication.

2.3.2

Secure and Private Interaction

Another challenge is how to verify the task originator and finisher. Different users may interact with
NeuCloud, then how to know which key should be used for the current task? Moreover, since all
the VM’s operations should bypass the VMM, how can the users make sure if the “NeuCloud” they
are interacting with is actually disguised by the VMM? It is possible that the cloud provider plays as
a middle-man to intercept secrets. To deal with the above problems, we need a secure and private
interaction protocol, illustrated in Figure 2.8.
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1. The cloud user securely communicate with VM1, for example by SSH. The data in VM1 are
classified into two categories: public, and private, of which the latter is pre-encrypted by the
symmetric key SKuser before being uploaded to the cloud. The SKuser , as well as the user’s public
key KPub
user , should also be agnostic to the cloud provider so it should be stored in VM1 encrypted
with KPub
SMM .
2. If it is the first time for VM1 to register itself to NeuCloud, it should request a registration
operation with corresponding keys and a random operation identity number m. VMM will add
this operation into task ring along with a unique ID of VM1. It doesn’t matter what the value of
ID is as long as it is consistent during VM1’s lifetime.

VM1 → VMM → NeuCloud : {ID, ({m, SKuser , KPub
}
user })KPub
SMM
3. The NeuCloud manager parses the task as registration and ask the sign/encrypt engine to decrypts
the keys of VM1. After that the manager stores the SKuser and the KPub
user in the ID entry. Now that
this operation has been finished, the manager returns to the outer world with signed operation
identity and the status marker ACK.

NeuCloud → VMM → VM1 : {ACK, [{ID, m}]KPri
}
SMM
4. After registration the VM1 can freely launch any data or policies related operations. Large
operations will be divided into small tasks by NeuCloud daemon in VMM.
5. A task’s accomplishment will pop out the task from the task queue. The task ring circles to other
VMs until it turns back to VM1. Then the next task of VM1 will be executed.
6. If a task is data manipulation or privacy policies updating, the front-end modules of NeuCloud
will send the workload to the back-end modules. All the workload in back-end modules will be
logged as a journal.
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7. The transitions between VMM and NeuCloud will keep going until the whole operation requested by VM1 is finished. Then the NeuCloud replies with the ACK, telling VMM to inform
the VM1 of the operation accomplishment.
8. Whether data flowing into NeuCloud should be encrypted or decrypted depends on the users’
requests. However, if the users fetch data out of the NeuCloud, the encryption of secrets claimed
by the privacy policies is enforced, where SKuser is used. The information flow of NeuCloud is
depicted in Figure 2.9. User can split their data into public data and private data, with private
data encrypted before uploading to the cloud. Private data can be copied into NeuCloud and,
optionally, be decrypted later. To fetch private data out, NeuCloud will always perform the
encryption process first. We note that it is not the encrypted status or the decrypted status that
determines the privacy labels of data; it is possible that the user decrypts his private data in
SMRAM just for performing operations on them. As illustrated by Figure 2.9, a decrypted data
can either be mapped as public objects(“Decrypted Private Data 1”), or be mapped as private
objects(“Decrypted Private Data 2”).
With NeuCloud, the user is confident about trading privacy with the cloud provider, or other
tenant service providers on the same platform: because the execution of data/policies manipulation is authenticate-able, the operations are logged and thus accountable, and the privacy is
well protected from all the cloud computing entities including the most privileged one, the cloud
provider. Based on NeuCloud, we can further design the incentive privacy trading mechanism
for cloud computing.

2.4 Formalization of Privacy Trading
Now that we have an excellent TCB to provide transparent privacy manipulations, we can continue to
investigate into the users’ reaction towards privacy revelation. The first task is to formalize the privacy
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sensitivity, namely the willingness to reveal the privacy. Consider the following situation: a cloud user
(U) rents computing resources from a cloud provider (P) and shares his private information to P in
order to achieve some target functions (e.g. data analysis). Of course in NeuCloud this user U has the
alternative choice to protect his privacy without the cloud provider’s participation.

U can never know how trusty the cloud provider P is. Although U knows how much privacy is released,
he has no idea of how the private information is used: it is absolutely possible that P maliciously makes
profit from selling the privacy to the adversaries of U. In order to quantify the cost of privacy revelation,
we define the revelation set of privacy and the the sensitivity of privacy as follows:
Definition 1 (Privacy revelation set) The set of private (or credential) items of U that can be requested

and released is denoted as Ω = {ω1 , ω2 , ..., ωπ }, where π is the total number of the private items. The
privacy revelation set ℘(Ω) = {ρ0 , ρ1 , ..., ργ } is defined as the powerset of Ω, which consists of all
the possible revelation combinations of the private items. Each ρi ∈ ℘(Ω)(i = 0, 1, ..., γ) is called a
privacy revelation portfolio, and γ is the cardinality of ℘(Ω). Specially, ρ0 = ∅ and ργ = Ω.
Cloud users may have different valuations on different privacy revelation portfolios. The valuation of
each portfolio is measured by the monetary mapping V(ρi ), i = 0, 1, ..., γ . For any ρi ∈ ℘(Ω), i =

0, 1, ..., γ , we have V(ρi ) ≥ 0 and specially V(ρ0 ) = 0. Suppose 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ γ , V(ρi ) > V(ρj )
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is equivalent to the proposition “ρi is valued higher than ρj ”. Similarly, V(ρi ) < V(ρj ) means “ρi is
less valued than ρj ”, and V(ρi ) = V(ρj ) reveals the equal valuation of U upon ρi and ρj . Generally

ρi ⊂ ρj implies V(ρi ) ≤ V(ρj ). The monetary function maps ρi , of which the value space is discrete
and heterogeneous, into V, of which the value space is continuous. Because the privacy set of one user
is always changing and the privacy sets of different users at some time are different with each other,
this continuous and homogeneous mapping is significant.
For U, the basic incentive of trading privacy is to gain some utility from other aspects; we denote “the
other aspect” as the “target goal”, and the corresponding gain as the “target gain” T. A large problem
is that the consumption of privacy is not necessarily correlated with the gain of the target goal; it is
possible that a change in the privacy domain has no influence on the domain of the taget goal. To
circumvent this problem, we introduce a intermediate domain, with quantification measurement ∆,
to “connect” the privacy domain and the target domain. The intermediate domain is similar to the
currency in economics. With the help of it, the consumption and gain can be transformed into:

V = µ(∆), T = ν(∆)

(2.1)

For simplicity, we assume each unit of ∆ has a linear relationship with the target gain and the privacy
consumption:

V = p∆, T = t∆

(2.2)

where p is the subjective privacy price of U and t is the marginal target gain.
We assume that U can freely consume any level of its privacy, by associating various data set with
various privacy policies. The incentive problem of U is described as:
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arg max∆ G(∆) = u(−V) + E(u(T))

(2.3)

where G is the net gain of the trading, u is the utility function mapping monetary value to satisfaction,
and E is the expectation function measuring the uncertain outcome. V and T can be replaced by the
form in Equation 2.2.
A rational user will always maximize his net gain of trading, so he will always try to locate the optimal
privacy trading portfolio. To solve the optimal solution of Equation 2.3 by calculating the first-order
condition, we have:

pu′ (−V) = E[tu′ (T)]

p = E[

u′ (T)
u′ (T)
u′ (T)
t
]
=
E
[
]
E
(
t
)
+
cov
(
, t)
u′ (−V)
u′ (−V)
u′ (−V)

(2.4)

(2.5)

The information contained in the Equation 2.4 is important: E[tu′ (T)] is the absolute marginal increase
of the target utility gain while pu′ (−V) is the marginal loss in utility of U; U will always continue
to trade privacy for the target goal until the marginal gain equals the marginal loss. Equation 2.5 is
′

(T)
, t) , is named as risk adjustment in economics. If it
even more useful: the second term, cov( uu′ (−
V)

is zero, the subjective price equals to the one conducted by a rational user without risk concerns; if
it is positive, the subjective price will be higher than the risk-neutral result, and if it is negative the
subjective price will be lower thus the user might love to take the risk. According to this criterion, we
have the following definition:
Definition 2 (Privacy risk sensitivity) The covariance term in Equation 2.5 quantifies the risk sensi-

tivity regarding to trading privacy. If the covariance is positive, the user is defined as privacy-riskaversion; if the covariance is negative, the user is defined as privacy-risk-loving; and if the covariance
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is zero, the user is defined as privacy-risk-neutral.

In cloud computing, the privacy trading mechanism is not only about affording the user’s privacy
values, but also about compensating his aversion of risks. Even we have introduced a trusted platform
of trading, the cloud user may still doubt on the later usage of the secrets. An incentive compatible
privacy trading mechanism should take this aspect into consideration.
In real world, the variables related to the target goal, T and t, are always pre-determined by the application scheme. So according to Equation 2.2, ∆ can be determined. Suppose U’s utility function is

u(x) = ln(x), then Equation 2.3 can be transformed to:

t
t
G(∆) = ln(T) − ln(V) = ln( ) = ln( ⋆
)
p
p +δ

(2.6)

where p⋆ is the marginal loss of privacy calculated by a rational privacy-risk-neutral cloud user, and δ
is the risk adjustment quantified by the covariance in Equation 2.5.

Theorem 1 In the cloud platform with transparent and fair trading mechanism of privacy, the cloud

users will accept the privacy transaction if and only if the marginal return, t, exceeds the subjective
marginal loss, which is the objective marginal loss p⋆ plus the subjective risk evaluation δ .

To make the privacy trading incentive-compatible, or to encourage the risk-aversion user to accept
the transactions, the cloud provider should compensate the user. For example, the cloud provider can
allocate more resource (either temporal or spatial) to the user, valued as ξ . If the cloud provider by
chance decide to compensate in the domain satisfying the user’s target goal, Equation 2.6 can be further
transformed to:

G(∆) = ln(T) − ln(V) = ln(
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t+ξ
t+ξ
) = ln( ⋆
)
p
p +δ

(2.7)

Table 2.1: Specifications of execution time measurement.
Hardware platform
Processor
AMD Phenom(tm)II X6 1035T Processor 2.60 GHz
Memory Size
8.00 GB
Operating System
Windows 7 64-bit
Software specification
BIOS
SeaBIOS 1.7.0
Simulator
QEMU 1.0.1
Cloud user workload
Operation
N tasks
Task
100 circles
Interval to call NeuCloud
η tasks
Percentage of tasks to in NeuCloud
ζ
Theorem 2 In order to make the privacy trading incentive-compatible, the cloud provider should

compensate the user with the value ξ = p⋆ + δ − t.

The specific estimation of p⋆ , δ and t is an empirical study and we will leave it to the future work.

2.5

Implementation and Evaluation

The hardware and software specifications of our implementation are listed in Table 2.1. We build a
BIOS with modified NeuCloud SMM handlers based on the open-source SeaBIOS project, and use
the QEMU as the simulator. We set the user space workload as an operation with N tasks. Each task
consists of 100 circles of execution (in our experiment, for simplicity, each execution is an empty loop
written in assembly language). NeuCloud (SMM mode) is called every η tasks in the normal system
mode, and the total percentage of tasks executed in NeuCloud is ζ .
Figure 2.10 shows the relationship between the execution time and the interval to call NeuCloud, when

N = 100000 and ζ = 50%. In the figure, η = 5 means every 5 tasks executed in normal system mode,
NeuCloud is called and there are 5 tasks to be executed in NeuCloud (since ζ = 50%, the numbers
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Figure 2.10: The relationship between the execution time and the interval to call NeuCloud (N =
10000, ζ = 50%).
of tasks outside and inside NeuCloud are the same). From the results we can learn that frequently
calling NeuCloud would lead to a significant increase of overhead and the frequency has an exponential
relationship with the overhead. That indicates that we should minimize the frequency to call NeuCloud
by accumulating tasks and executing them all at once in NeuCloud.
Figure 2.11 shows the relationship between the execution time and the percentage of tasks executed
in NeuCloud, from which we can learn that 1) execution in SMM is way faster than in normal system
mode; 2) the more tasks executed in NeuCloud, the faster the operation will be finished.

2.6

A Variation of NeuCloud

The NeuCloud architecture set up a concrete base for trusted and transparent privacy trading. However,
it does have several drawbacks:
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1. Scheduling complexity: when the processor jumps into SMM, all the current tasks in the normal
system mode will be interrupted and paused, until the processor’s returning back from SMM. So
the scheduling design should be pretty tricky: 1) we can’t trap into SMM as soon as we meet a
NeuCloud call, because according to the results in Figure 2.10, the high frequency will kill the
system performance; 2) we may accumulate a bunch of NeuCloud call and execute them at one
time, and the results shown in Figure 2.11 have proved that it won’t take a long time to execute
in SMM. But the threshold of accumulated task number is not easy to set, since the waiting time
in the queue is also performance killer.
2. Storage protection: SMM disables all the interruptions, which is both good and bad. The good
side is that no one can interrupt the execution in the protected domain. But the bad side is
that NeuCloud cannot control any hardware devices with the help of interruption, for example,
hard drive read/write. Thus so far NeuCloud only provides memory protection, without storage
protection.
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Figure 2.12 illustrates the improved version of NeuCloud. When NeuCloud is called, it no longer
directly executes any tasks. Instead, it shrinks the SMRAM region and “exposes” a VMM in normal
system mode to run the tasks. After tasks are finished, the new VMM turns back control to NeuCloud
and then NeuCloud returns to the legacy VMM. The new VMM being summoned by NeuCloud is also
pre-programmed into the BIOS along with the other NeuCloud code. Because the summoned VMM is
executed in normal system mode, the above drawbacks can be well solved. Figure 2.13 illustrates the
implementation of this improved variation of NeuCloud.

1. After CRTM, BIOS loads NeuCloud code into SMRAM, and set the SMRAM range (up to 4GB).
2. BIOS loads the MBR of the NeuCloud VMM to the hard drive. If the boot-loader exceeds 512
Byte, the NeuCloud VMM MBR should boot a stage-1 block outside MBR to perform the future
loading work.
3. The NeuCloud VMM MBR first of all shrink back the SMRAM, then boot the NeuCloud VMM.
We intentionally locate the VMM memory space inside the SMRAM. After booting up, the
NeuCloud VMM returns to the bootloader, which reset the SMRAM to “cover” the NeuCloud
VMM into protection.
4. Then the NeuCloud VMM MBR loads the legacy VMM MBR from the disk.
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Figure 2.13: A variation of NeuCloud: the implementation
5. From now on, everything is the same with the legacy platform. The legacy VMM is loaded and
then the VMs.
6. When NeuCloud is needed, the legacy VMM requests a SMI.
7. Upon entering into SMM, NeuCloud front-end works as we described before.
8. Then NeuCloud shrinks back the SMRAM and releases the NeuCloud VMM to serve the workload.
9. Once finishing the tasks, NeuCloud turns control back to NeuCloud by calling SMI.
10. NeuCloud reset the SMRAM to cover the NeuCloud VMM, and returns to the legacy VMM.

Due to time and space limitations, we will evaluate the variation of NeuCloud in our future work.
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2.7

Summary

In this chapter, we proposes a novel architecture, NeuCloud, to enable partially, trusted, transparently, accountably privacy manipulation and revelation. With the help of this architecture, the privacysensitive users can be more confident to move to public clouds. A trusted computing base is not enough,
in order to stimulate incentive-compatible privacy trading, we present a theoretical framework and
provide the guidelines for cloud provider to compensate the cloud user’s privacy-risk-aversion. We
implement the NeuCloud and evaluate it. Moreover, a improved model of NeuCloud is discussed.
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Chapter 3
No free-riders: Incentive Compatible Moving
Target Defense Against VM-Colocation
Attacks in Clouds
Although IaaS offers cost-efficiency and ease-of-use to cloud users, there are significant security concerns that need to be addressed when considering moving critical applications and sensitive data to the
clouds. Recent work [41] reveals the problem of side-channel based attacks through virtual machine
colocation, showing that the adversaries can map the internal VM-placement of the cloud and mount
cross-VM side-channel attacks by placing malicious VMs on the victim’s physical server.
Many software level approaches [37] and hardware modification methods [47, 26] have been developed against the side-channel attacks. Unfortunately, the software approach cannot perfectly cover the
new advances in attack models, and the hardware approach, modifying the cloud physical platform,
is far from practical for commercial clouds. Using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, the

Shamir’s secret sharing approach [43] can make the attack much harder. We can split our secret D
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Figure 3.1: Shamir’s secret sharing in cloud environment and the moving target defense through VMmigration.
into k pieces and store them into k VMs 1 . Using Shamir’s secret sharing, D can be easily constructed
from all k pieces but knowledge less than k pieces reveals no information about D. Note that the secret
sharing might be controlled by either a single party or multiple parties [6]. Thus, the attacker will be
forced to use brute-force-attacks to achieve colocation with multiple target VMs, according to [41].
Now, the defense problems becomes how to protect the k pieces from being all captured by the attacker.
The methods to securely live-migrate VMs [14, 30] can make it much harder for adversaries to locate
the target VMs [24]. As shown in Figure 3.1, the secret, “helloworld”, is divided into two pieces and
held by two VMs, initially as VM0 and VM2 . An attacker can launch VMs colocated with the benign
VMs with some probabilities. For example, if VM3 is controlled by an attacker, the attacker will be
able to extract partial secret, “hello”, out of VM0 . Although the splitting of “helloworld” into “hello”
and “world” can prevent the attack from reconstructing the secret from VM3 , we should at the same
time guarantee that VM5 can never be taken over by the same attacker. The fact that the attack would
simultaneously attempt to launch lots of VMs to enumerate the colocations with both VM0 and VM2
motivates the migration of the VMs, e.g. moving VM0 to VM1 . Unfortunately, there is currently no
formal model to guide the dynamic migration strategy for clouds. Similarly, quantifying the benefits
of dynamism still remains an open problem.
Intuitively, the cloud provider can offload the choice to cloud users, letting them migrating at free will.
It is not necessary to have k identical VMs. We can have one service VM and k − 1 secret holding VMs that can be
very small and cost little.
1
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Or the cloud provider can migrate VMs according to the security demand - those VMs with higher
security demand of dynamism have higher chances to be migrated. At first glance, this is reasonable.
However, as long as some of the VMs sharing the secret are migrated, other VMs can take the free ride
of the achieved dynamism. Since any rational cloud user will try to maximize their benefit2 , he/she
could report a lower preference of dynamism than the actual one, pining its hope on other VMs honest
movements to reach the security goal. So in this case, the game equilibrium is that no one would
truthfully report the security valuation and migrate.
Our goal and contributions: To solve the aforementioned problems, the goals of this work are (1) to

model the migration benefit and cost, (2) to provide instructional criteria for the migration strategy of
the cloud provider, and (3) to motivate the cloud users to migrate in a incentive-compatible way. In order to address these issues, we develop a migration strategy based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)
mechanism[36] in game theories, which can maximize the social welfare given the individuals are all
“selfish”.
The contributions of this work are as follows. To the best of our knowledge, (1) this is the first work
to address VM-colocation based attacks in clouds using moving target defense; (2) our work is the
first effort to apply VCG game and realize incentive compatible migration in cloud; (3) we offer two
criteria about how to make the strategy acceptable by rational cloud users, and how to determine the
optimal time interval of migrations, (4) our analytical evaluation shows that our defense approach is
practical for commercial clouds.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we review some of the fundamental concepts
of game theory, especially the VCG mechanism. In Section 3.2, we present our proposed method.
In Section 3.3, we evaluate the security and practicability of our scheme. We conclude the work in
Section 3.4.
2
Note that even if all the VMs sharing the secret are controlled by one user, because different VMs may have different
purposes, each VM should be treated as an independent party with individual interest.
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3.1

Preliminaries

3.1.1 Assumptions and Notations
We have the following assumptions: (1) the cloud controller and the migration process are all secure;
(2) for simplicity, each migration of a VM will result in a constant cost in terms of service interruption and consume the same amount of resources; (3) the cloud provider has enough CPU, network
bandwidth, and other resources to perform arbitrary migration; (4) the cloud provider has sufficient
resources as the reward, e.g., extra memory or CPUs, to motivate the players to migrate, which will
be further discussed later; and (5) a node’s destination of migration is randomly chosen, as long as the
cloud has free space. In reality, cloud provider would take performance and efficacy into consideration during the migration. For example, VMs with frequent connections should be placed close to each
other. In this work, for simplicity, we only measure security in the goal function, but a commercial
cloud can freely modify the goal function as needed, where our game model remains the same.
The incentive problem of cloud migration can be modelled as a game. The specific game discussed
here is a finite player, single round, simultaneous action, incomplete information game, with payoffs
depending on the final result of players’ actions. In the cloud migration problem, the game players,

P1 , P2 , ..., Pn , are n VMs sharing a secret. The cloud provider (game mediator) is denoted as Pt , who
doesn’t participate in the game but operates the game. Players have actions which they can perform
at designated times in the game, and as a result they receive payoffs. The actions of the players are
denoted as X = (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ), and specially X−i = (x1 , x2 , ..., xi−1 , xi+1 , ..., xn ). The players have
different pieces of information, on which the payoffs may depend; each player has his/her individual
strategy to maximize his or her payoff. Each player Pi ∈ {P1 , P2 , ..., Pn } can decide whether to accept
the migration request from Pt or not, so xi = {accept, refuse}. For those who agree to migrate, the
direct payment is p̄i , which measures the cost of downtime due to live migration. Here we assume the
cost of downtime is a constant value for each Pi . As a result of migration, all the players get benefited.
34

We measure the benefit as vi (X), where the valuation function vi quantifies Pi ’s real security demand
of the overall dynamism. However, under the assumption of incomplete information, Pi can decide to
report a fake valuation function v′i at will. Finally, the utility function of each player is ui = vi − pi ,
where pi is the total payment.

3.1.2 Incentive Compatible Game
While our ultimate goal is to design a migration strategy to fulfil some security requirements, the problem is that in real-world cloud environment most of the cloud users are not willing to migrate their VMs
unless it is necessary, because the migration will result in service interruption. So the main purpose of
our work is to design an incentive compatible mechanism to mitigate this problem. Following Nisan’s
work [36], the terms “mechanism” and “incentive compatible” are defined as :

Definition 3 (Mechanism) [36] Given a set of n players, and a set of outcomes, A, let Vi be the set

of possible valuation functions of the form vi (a) which player i could have for an outcome a ∈ A. A
mechanism is a function f : V1 × V2 × ... × Vn → A. Given the valuations claimed by the players, f
selects an outcome, and n payment functions, p1 , p2 , ..., pn , where pi : V1 × V2 × ... × Vn → R.
Definition 4 (Incentive compatible) [36] If, for every player i, every v1 ∈ V1 , v2 ∈ V2 , ..., vn ∈ Vn ,

and every v′i ∈ Vi , where a = f(vi , v−i ) and a′ = f(v′i , v−i ), then vi (a)− pi (vi , v−i ) ≥ vi (a′ )− pi (v′i , v−i ),
then the mechanism is incentive compatible.

Specially, among those incentive compatible mechanisms, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is the mostly used one. The VCG mechanism generally seeks to maximize the social welfare of
∑n
all players in one game, where the social welfare is calculated as i=1 vi . So the goal function of VCG
∑n
is argmaxa∈A i=1 vi . The VCG mechanism and the rule to design VCG mechanisms [36] are defined
as:
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Definition 5 (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism) [36] A mechanism, consisting of payment functions

p1 , p2 , ..., pn and a function f, for a game with outcome set A, is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha∑
nism if f(v1 , v2 , ..., vn ) = argmaxa∈A vi (a) (f maximizes the social welfare) and for some functions
∑
h1 , h2 , ..., hn , where hi : V−i → R (hi does not depend on vi ), ∀vi ∈ V, pi (vi ) = h(v−i ) − j̸=i vj .

Definition 6 (Clarke pivot rule) [36] The choice hi (v−i ) = maxb∈A

∑

j̸=i vi (b)

is called the Clarke
∑
pivot payment. Under this rule the payment of player i is pi (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ) = maxb j̸=i vi (b) −
∑
j̸=i vi (a), where a = f(v1 , v2 , ..., vn ).

3.2 VM-migration Based Moving Target Defence
3.2.1 The Optimal Number of Moving VMs
At first glance, it appears that maximum dynamism can be achieved if all VMs migrate, but in this
section we will disprove it and find the optimal number of moving VMs. As denoted in Section 3.1,
each player has the unique valuation function vi (X), where X = (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ) is the vector of actions
of all players. Intuitively, vi has a positive correlation with the randomness or diversity of the VM
placement. Suppose there are m physical nodes as the available candidates, and γ of them are randomly
chosen as the migration destination, of which the capacities (the maximum number of extra VMs one
node can host using its current free space) are C = c1 , c2 , ..., cγ . If k out of n VMs are randomly
∑γ
selected to be migrated (k <
i=1 ci ), the number of possible placements, N(m, γ, n, k, C) can be
derived using the Balls In Bins analysis.
For selecting γ ones out of the m nodes, and selecting k ones out of the n VMs, the numbers of possible
schemes are given respectively:
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9

15

x 10

m=10: k

=11, N

opt

=1.09e+10

max

m=9: kopt=11, Nmax=3.37e+9
10

m=8: kopt=10, Nmax=9.33e+8

N

m=7: kopt=10, Nmax=2.40e+8
5

0
0

5

10

15

20

25

k

Figure 3.2: The k-N relationship when n=25, c̄ = 4, and m=γ varies from 10 to 7.

( )
( )
m
n
S(m, γ) =
, T(n, k) =
γ
k

(3.1)

The generating function for placing k distinguishable VMs (balls) in γ distinguishable nodes (bins) is

GF =

γ
ci
∑
∏
xj
i=1 j=0

where the coefficient of

xk
,
k!

j!

(3.2)

denoted as θ(γ, k, C), is the number of the total number of possible place-

ments.
Specially, if c1 = c2 = ... = cγ = c̄, Equation 3.2 reduces to be

x2 x3
xc̄ γ
GF = (1 + x + + + ... + )
2!
3!
c̄!

(3.3)

Finally, the total number of possible VM-placements is

N(m, γ, n, k, C) = S(m, γ)T(n, k)θ(γ, k, C)
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(3.4)

Given the m, γ , n and C, we can use Equation 3.4 to find kopt , which is the optimal number of moving
VMs corresponding to the largest N. To make it tangible, an example curve illustrating the k − N
relationship is shown in Figure 3.2. Since S(m, γ) does not contribute too much in the magnitude of

N, we simply set γ = m (so S(m, γ) = 1); for demonstration, we set the total VMs as n = 25 and the
capacity of each destination node as c̄ = 4. From the curve we can learn that:

1. It is not true that a larger k is better, which means that the intuitive strategy of migrating VMs as
many as possible is incorrect.
2. A larger γ , namely more destination nodes, significantly increases the number of possible placement schemes.
3. Compared to γ , N is even more sensitive to k. N can reach the order of 109 when k is still in
the order of 101 , which implies the huge potential of VM migration as a moving target defense
strategy.

On the one hand, the optimal k is given by

kopt = argmaxk N(m, γ, n, k, C)

(3.5)

and in reality, only cloud provider controls the complete information of m, γ, n, k, C, so it is the cloud
provider’s responsibility to calculate the kopt .
On the other hand, if we assign 1 to accept and 0 to refuse, we have the actual number of moving VMs,

kreal , as:
kreal =

n
∑

xi

(3.6)

i=1

In economics, the valuation function should reflect the security preference of the cloud users. Since
this is not the main focus of this work, we simply model the preference as a linear function of the
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system diversity:

vi (X)|m,γ,n,C = λi N(m, γ, n,

n
∑

xi , C) + ηi

(3.7)

i=1

where λi and ηi are determined by the ith cloud user’s preference.
Once the cloud provider decides the security level, and thus the value of k, the rest is to motivate the
randomly chosen k VMs, denoted as Ω, to get migrated. To satisfy the Clarke pivot rule defined in
Definition 6, we design the payment function for each Pi ∈ Ω as:

pi (X) =

∑

vj (X−i ) −

∑

vj (X) + p̄i

(3.8)

j̸=i

j̸=i

where p̄i is the constant cost due to service interruption as assumed. We will further introduce the
determination of p̄i in Section 3.2.2.
The second part of Equation 3.8, −

∑

j̸=i vj (X),

is actually a positive reward from cloud provider to the

ith VM. It can be any form with monetary value equalling to it, like extra CPU scheduling credit, bonus
∑
VM life, extra network bandwidth and so on, depending on the need of Pi . The first part, j̸=i vj (X−i ),
is the monetary charge of Pi . If Pi chooses accept, p̄i is the actual migration cost; if Pi chooses refuse, p̄i
is in the form of monetary charge. Given that everyone else accepts migration, if Pi decides to migrate,
we have kreal = kopt ; if Pi refuses to do so, kreal = kopt − 1.

Theorem 3 (The criterion for the migration decision) The mechanism with the valuation function

shown in Equation 3.7 and the payment function shown in Equation 3.8 is individually rational if and
only if

n
∑

λi (N(m, γ, n, kopt , C) − N(m, γ, n, kopt − 1, C)) > p̄i

i=1

Proof: To prove that the mechanism is individually rational, we should show that the mechanism has
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a utility of at least zero for each of the players. For those selected to be migrated:

ui (X) = vi (X) − pi (X) =

n
∑

vi (X) −

n
∑
j̸=i

i=1

=

n
∑

vj (X−i ) − p̄i

λi (N(m, γ, n, kopt , C) − N(m, γ, n, kopt − 1, C)) − p̄i

(3.9)

i=1

Only when the value of the above equation is larger than 0, Pi can achieve individual rationality. As
a matter of fact, Theorem 3 provides a criterion for cloud provider to decide whether a migration is
cost-efficient.
Theorem 4 (Incentive Compatibility) The mechanism with the above valuation and payment functions

is incentive compatible and thus motivates the players to truthfully reveal their security preference.
Proof: To get to the proof of incentive compatibility, we must show that for any given i, X−i and the

Pi ’s choice xi = accept or xi = refuse:

ui (X = accept ∪ X−i ) ≥ ui (X′ = refuse ∪ X−i )

(3.10)

The utility of Pi for X is given by

ui (X) = vi (X) − pi (X) =

n
∑

vi (X) −

′

ui (X ) =

n
∑

′

vi (X ) −

n
∑
j̸=i

i=1

So we have
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vj (X−i ) − p̄i

(3.11)

j̸=i

i=1

Likewise,

n
∑

vj (X−i ) − p̄i

(3.12)

Table 3.1: Platform specifications of migration downtime experiment.
Hardware (source and destination nodes):
CPU: Intel Xeon x5650 2.66GHz × 2
RAM: 8GB DDR3 1333MHz × 3
Ethernet: Broadcom NetXtreme II BCM5709

ui (X) − ui (X′ ) =

n
∑
i=1

=

n
∑

vi (X) −

n
∑

VMM:
Xen version: 4.0.1-21326-02-0.5
Dom0: openSUSE 11.3 x86_64
Dom0 kernel: 2.6.34.7-0.7-xen

vi (X′ )

i=1

λi (N(m, γ, n, kopt , C) − N(m, γ, n, kopt − 1, C))

(3.13)

i=1

According to Equation 3.5, the value of Equation 3.13 is always non-negative. Therefore, the mechanism is incentive compatible.

3.2.2 The Constant Cost of Migration
In Equation 3.8 we introduced the p̄i , which is the constant cost of service interruption each time Pi
is migrated. According to [30], p̄i is determined by the initial memory size of a VM and the applications’ memory access pattern. For demonstration, we illustrate the downtime due to migration in
Figure 3.3. The platform specifications are listed in Table 3.1, and the VM that we migrate is of 1
vcpu, 1 GB memory and 4 GB disk. To test the influence to the cpu execution, we keep the VM executing “for(i=0;i<999999;i++); gettimeofday(&time,NULL);” and recording the execution
period. As shown in 3.3a, the migration will bring in an execution delay of around 350ms. To test
the influence to the network service, we keep measuring the VM’s response delay of GET requests. As
shown in 3.3b, there will be a 967ms downtime to the web server. Pt and each Pi can estimate the p̄i
respectively, according to the service downtime.
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(a) Impact on CPU execution time of a certain task due to migration. As illustrated in the graph, the execution
downtime is around 360ms.
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(b) Migration impact on response delay of web server. As illustrated in the graph, the web service downtime due
to migration is 967ms.

Figure 3.3: The influence of migration to VM computation and web service.
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3.2.3 Defense Timeline
Although the migration can confuse the attackers and force them to restart the attack procedures, with
time going by the attackers can still figure out the new VM placement as well. To solve the problem,
we have to keep migrating the VMs, and how to determine the optimal time interval becomes a new
problem. Following the model in [16], the State Transition Diagram (STG) of attacks is shown in Figure 3.4a. More specifically, the attackers have to firstly probe the placement of the VMs, for example,
by continually creating and stopping their probing VMs and testing the colocation with target VMs;
then, it takes some time to construct the attacks; and there is still a period before the attackers successfully gathering all the information. Any distortion of the VM placement, for example, by migrating
any of the VMs to other places, will reset the attack to the initial state.
As shown in Figure 3.4b, suppose the total time needed for a successful attack is t1 , the time interval
between any two migrations t2 should satisfy t2 < t1 , which offers the cloud provider the criterion to
determine migration intervals. If t2 ≥ t1 , there is a highly chance for the attackers to fully extract the
secret. In reality the constructing time and the launching time of the attacks could be treated as constants, while the probing time has a linear relationship with the N, which explodes with the increasing
of γ as shown in Figure 3.5d.

3.3

Evaluation

3.3.1 Security
We can never guarantee that our defense strategy or algorithm is agnostic to the adversaries. So when
we design a moving target defense scheme, we must ensure that the adversaries are impossible or
difficult to recover our actual internal infrastructures even if the strategy is not secret. In the mechanism
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Figure 3.4: The timeline of attacks and moving target defense (VM migration).
designed here, we assume that the forms of the valuation function and the deliberate payment function
are known to the public. However, in reality the individual security preference is kept as a privacy of
each cloud user, thus the adversaries have no way to get λi and ηi . Even if some of these parameterpairs are exposed, as long as the adversaries cannot obtain the information of all the VMs in the cloud,
our strategy based on the overall social welfare is always secure. Furthermore, during the generation
of the migration scheme, γ are randomly chosen and the capacity C = {c1 , c2 , ..., cn } is a secret of
cloud provider only, thus according to Equation 3.5 the final migration scheme is only known to cloud
provider.
Another indicator of one moving target defense scheme’s capability is the number of the total target
space. As demonstrated later in Figure 3.5d, N can increase rapidly with a small increase of γ . With
the exploding number of possible VM placements, the adversaries are extremely difficult to enumerate
all the possibilities.
We note that there might be information leakage during VM migration. But since the design of migration methods is not within the scope of this work, we prospect more secured VM migration mechanisms.
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Table 3.2: Amazon EC2 Linux/UNIX instances pricing and specifications (US East, up to January
2012) [2] .
Instance types
Small
Large

Price
$0.085 per hour
$0.34 per hour

Memory
1.7 GB
7.5 GB

Compute Units
1
4

Storage
160 GB
850 GB

API name
m1.small
m1.large

3.3.2 Practicability
As shown in Figure 3.5, compared with c̄, γ contributes more on the value of both kopt and Nmax . Empirically, kopt ≈ γ ; theoretically, for any c1 , c2 , x ∈ N and c1 < c2 we have

xc1
c1 !

>

xc2
c2 !

c

and limc→∞ xc! = 0,

so according to Equation 3.3, γ has a significantly larger influence on the value of kopt . Consequently,
for the real-world cloud providers, it is pretty easy to determine the optimal strategy by assigning

kopt = γ without complex algorithms, which maks this approach scalable.
Another potential concern is that whether the cloud users are willing to split a secret into multiple
VMs, which is the precondition of our VM migration based defense. As shown in Table 3.2, the small
instance has a price of 1/4 of the price of the large one, and offers 1/4 of the compute units, 1/4.4 of
the memory and 1/5.3 of the storage. Therefore splitting a secret from one large VM into four samll
VMs won’t largely increase the cost. Compare with the risk of being attacked through covert channels,
the cloud users will be willing to endure the cost due to transferring computation from few large VMs
to numerous small VMs.

3.4

Summary

To summarize, we proposed an incentive compatible moving target defense of cloud VM-colocation
attacks, based on the VCG mechanism. When the migration is acceptable by rational users and how to
determine the time interval are discussed. Our analysis shows that this defense strategy is practical to
be applied to commercial clouds.
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Figure 3.5: The influence to kopt and corresponding Nmax by adjusting c̄ or γ in Equation 3.5.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Works
Cloud computing has proved itself as one of the greatest inventions in human history, but the current
design brings in some troublesome problems, like the balance of cooperation benefits and privacy
concerns between the cloud provider and the cloud users, and the balance of cooperation benefits and
free-rider concerns between different cloud users. This thesis strives to address theses two incentive
problems. To solve the service-privacy conflict, a novel cloud computing architecture is proposed
enabling trusted and transparent privacy exchange. With the trusted cloud provider as the arbiter, the
free-rider problem also gets settled based on a game theory model.
The solution to the first problem can be further improved. As described in Section 2.6, we can ameliorate the drawbacks of NeuCloud, such as scheduling complicacy and device management restrictions,
by inserting a new VMM context into the architecture. Moreover, although NeuCloud sheds a light on
trusted and transparent privacy trading, some crucial factors in the privacy trading theories need future
empirical study and investigation.
The second part of work can also be extended in different avenues. First, only security goal is considered here for simplicity, but the valuation and payment functions can be easily adjusted to include

47

the performance considerations. Second, so far we have only considered the non-cooperative game.
Actually, there might be some connections between VMs on cloud, forming a cooperative game which
is a competition between coalitions of players rather than between individual players. In the future, we
will develop the mechanism in regard to the coordination game. Furthermore, in the next step, we will
extend the mechanism to suite into the asymmetric information game, because in reality some VMs are
offering services to other VMs (thus knowing some statistics of the latter), and some VMs may even
be controlled by attackers with some knowledge of other VMs.
As a whole, the main objective of this study is to provide an incentive-compatible to eliminate the
cloud user’s privacy or cooperative concerns. We hope that the proposed methodology can benefit
those commercial clouds some day. The theoretical part of this work can be extended to other fields
where incentive concerns about privacy, trust and cooperation exist.
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